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ABSTRACT
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated
ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, making same-sex marriage the "law of the
land" throughout the United States.' Obergefell culminated, at least for
now, a four-decades long legal war, but it hardly ended the accompanying
legal and political battles. Those battles had started well before the
Obergefell decision, as states, and sometimes municipalities, had enacted
either same-sex marriage per se2 or some sort of marriage-like recognition
* Professor Emeritus, the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle,
PA. Email: rerl0@psu.edu. This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the 16th World
Conference of the International Society of Family Law in Amsterdam, July 2017.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605, 2607-08, 2632 (2015).
2. The first state to authorize same-sex marriage per se was Massachusetts because of two
decisions by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: Goodridge v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage violated the
Massachusetts Constitution), and In re Ops. to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 577 (Mass. 2004) (ruling
that an act to create "civil unions" for same-sex couples with all the legal attributes of civil marriage
would not cure the violation of rights found in Goodridge). By the time of the Obergefell decision, 11
states, plus the District of Columbia, had enacted same-sex marriage laws. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at
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for same-sex couples-with names such as "reciprocal beneficiaries"' or
"civil unions."4 Opposition has come from state and local officials (refusing

to issue marriage licenses, refusing to perform weddings, refusing to issue
documents listing same-sex spouses, etc.)' and from private businesses
providing public accommodations (wedding venues, photographers, florists,
etc.).6 By the time this Article is published, the Supreme Court will have
heard oral argument in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case in which a bakery
owner is asserting the constitutional right to refuse-on religious and free
speech grounds-to make and decorate a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple.
This Article will: examine the Obergefell majority and dissenting
opinions, recount the various battles being waged by opponents of legal
recognition of same-sex couples and those entities which do not want to
provide wedding-related services to same-sex couples, consider our
political divide on gay rights issues, and finally attempt, with great
trepidation, to posit a way forward that might satisfy--or dissatisfy--both
camps equally.

2611, app. B (listing state legislation and judicial decisions legalizing same-sex marriage). Multiple
other states authorized same-sex marriage because they were mandated to do so by a federal or state
court order. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608-10, app. A (listing state and federal decisions on samesex marriage).
3. See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 1211 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (2016)) ("The
purpose of this chapter is to extend certain rights and benefits which are presently available only to
married couples to couples composed of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying
under state law."). Hawaii created the category of "reciprocal beneficiaries" for same-sex couples in
1997 as part of its response to the ongoing litigation regarding same-sex marriage in Baehr. Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) ("holding "that sex is a 'suspect category' for purposes of equal
protection analysis" under the Hawaii State Constitution).
4. Vermont enacted civil unions in 2000 in response to the Vermont Supreme Court's
decision in Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2)
(2016) ("'Civil union' means that two eligible persons have established a relationship pursuant to this
chapter, and may receive the benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of spouses.");
see also 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72-73 ("The purpose of this act is to respond to the constitutional
violation found by the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State, and to provide eligible same-sex
couples the opportunity to 'obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to married
opposite-sex couples' as required by Chapter I, Article 7th of the Vermont Constitution.").
5. Cheryl Wetzstein, States Rebel Against Supreme Court Gay Marriage Ruling, WASH.
TwIES (July 6, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/6/states-rebel-against-supremecourt-gay-marriage-ri/.
6. See Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62-63 (N.M. 2013) (holding that
it is discriminatory for a commercial wedding photographer to refuse service based on sexual
orientation).
7. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted sub
nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rts. Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). Interestingly, a
similar challenge is making its way to the U.K. Supreme Court in a case from Northern Ireland, Lee v.
McArthur [2016] NICA (Civ) 39 (N. Ir.).
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I. THE OBERGEFELL DECISION

As noted, on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court delivered its highly
anticipated decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, and, by a vote of 5-4, held
that: (1) states must permit same-sex.couples to marry; and (2) a state may
not refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another
state on the ground of its same-sex character. 8 Justice Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion, as he had in Romer v. Evans (1996)9 (striking down a
state constitutional amendment barring the state and its political
subdivisions from protecting homosexuals against discrimination),
Lawrence v. Texas (2003)o (striking down a state law criminalizing private
homosexual conduct between consenting adults), and United States v.
Windsor (2013)" (striking down the provision in the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) barring the federal government from recognizing
same-sex marriages that were valid under state law). Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Obergefell's majority opinion. 12
Each of the four dissenting Justices--Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito-wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which
one or more of the other dissenters joined." Each opinion merits attention.
Obergefell was actually four consolidated cases in which plaintiffs
challenged the respective laws of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee, restricting marriage to one man and one woman.14 Plaintiffs
won their case in each federal district court." The defendant states
appealed, 6 and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
upheld the challenged statutes.17 This put the Sixth Circuit at odds with
other recent federal circuit court decisions, thus creating a "circuit split,"
making the issue ripe for review by the Supreme Court."

8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015).
9. Romer v. Evans, 517.U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996).
10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986)).
11. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
12. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2591.
13. Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id at 2631
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
14. Id at 2584 (majority opinion).
15. Id at 2593.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 402 (6th Cir. 2014).
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A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion started with a brief history of the
institution of marriage, noting the "transcendent importance" of that
institution. 19 Kennedy correctly acknowledged that, "[i]t is fair and
necessary to say these references [to the historical importance of marriage]
were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two
persons of the opposite sex." 20 He proceeded to relate the stories of three of
the sets of plaintiffs and the difficulties they had encountered, which were
caused by application of the challenged statutes. 21
The majority noted that "[t]he history of marriage is one of both
continuity and change." 22 We have abandoned (at least in the United States,
with isolated exceptions) arranged marriages based on political, religious,
and financial concerns. 2 3 A married woman is no longer considered to be a
femme covert without legal rights.24
Likewise, society's views of homosexuality have evolved from the
time when "[s]ame-sex intimacy [was] a crime in many States." 25 The
American Psychiatric Association has long since abandoned the view
announced in its first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders in 1952 that homosexuality was a mental disorder. 26 The Court's
own views of homosexuality have evolved since Bowers v. Hardwick in
1986,27 which upheld the crime of sodomy, with recognition of various gay
rights in Romer (1996),28 Lawrence (2003),29 and Windsor (2013).30
Addressing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
majority noted that the Court has long held that the right to marry is a
fundamental right or liberty of which one cannot be deprived without due
process of law. In Loving v. Virginia (1967), the Court unanimously
struck down bans on interracial marriage, holding that marriage is "one of
19. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593-94.
20. Id. at 2594.
21. Id. at 2594-95.
22. Id. at 2595.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id at 2596.
26. Id.
27. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
28. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (recognizing the right of equal protection for gay and
lesbian persons).
29. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (providing that the right to liberty includes
private sexual conduct).
30. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013) (finding the portion of the Defense
of Marriage Act, which excluded same-sex partners from the definition of "spouse," unconstitutional).
31. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600, 2604-05, 2607-08.
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the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." 32 In Zablocki v. Redhail (1978), the Court struck down a law
preventing "deadbeat dads" from marrying.33 In Turner v. Safley (1987), the
Court struck down a prison regulation which permitted a prison inmate to
marry only after the superintendent found a compelling reason to grant the
inmate such permission.34 While the Obergefell majority acknowledged its
1972 summary affirmance in Baker v. Nelson, which denied a right to
same-sex marriage,3 5 it conveniently neglected to mention two other cases
in which it had upheld marriage impediments: Butler v. Wilson (1974)36
(prohibition on marriage for prisoners serving a life sentence), and Califano
v. Jobst (1977)37 (termination of certain Social Security benefits upon
marriage).
The Obergefell majority distilled four principles or premises from its
precedents: (1) "the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent
in the concept of individual autonomy," 38 (2) "the right to marry is
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals," 39 (3) "[marriage] safeguards
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of
childrearing, procreation, and education,"40 and (4) "marriage is a keystone
of our social order." 41 Denying these benefits to same-sex couples who
wish to marry violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that "no
State shall 'deprive any person of... liberty . . without due process of
law."' 4 2

Additionally, denial of the right of same-sex couples to marry also
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that "[n]o State
shall . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." 43 Notably, although there is very extensive jurisprudence
concerning the standard to be applied when a statute is challenged on equal
32. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
33. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375, 382, 390-91 (1978).
34. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82, 100 (1987).
35. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598; see also Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972)
(dismissing appeal "for want of a substantial federal question").
36. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974) (mem.) (upholding a New York statute prohibiting
prisoners serving a life sentence from marrying).
37. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 48 (1977) (finding that termination of certain Social
Security benefits upon marriage did not violate due process).
38. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
39. Id. Despite its repeated references to marriage as a two-person union, the majority never
explains the two-person limitation.
40. Id. at 2600.
41. Id. at 2601.
42. Id. at 2597 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend XIV).
43. U.S. CONST. amend XIV; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
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protection grounds-strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational
basis-the majority never even mentioned, much less explained, what
standard it was applying.44 Based on the foregoing holdings concerning due
process and equal protection, "Baker v. Nelson must be and now is
overruled ....

The majority explained why the judiciary must act to correct this
situation rather than wait on the democratic process. "[T]he Constitution
contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, so long
as that process does not abridge fundamental rights."4 6 Because
fundamental rights were being denied to same-sex couples who could not
marry, a cautious approach was unwarranted.
Briefly addressing the second issue, the majority ruled that because
same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry in all states, it follows
that "there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful
same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its samesex character." 4 7
In rather ambiguous language, the majority opined on what was
already a hot-button issue in states permitting same-sex marriagereligiously based objections-as follows:
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who
adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with
utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex
marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures
that religious organizations and persons are given proper
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so
fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own
deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long
revered.48

To what extent religious objectors may go beyond advocating and teaching
to demonstrate their position remains a deeply divisive issue.

44. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (applying the "most rigid scrutiny"
standard-a functional analog of "strict scrutiny"-to a statute barring interracial marriage (quoting
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977)
(applying "intermediate scrutiny," rather than strict scrutiny, to a statute discriminating on the basis of
illegitimacy); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435, 450 (1985) (applying
"rational basis" scrutiny to an ordinance discriminating against intellectually disabled persons).
45. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
46. Id. at 2605.
47. Id. at 2607-08.
48. Id. at 2607.
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B. The Dissenting Opinions
The four dissenting opinions authored by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito are notable for going far beyond
expressing a mere disagreement with the decision and how that case should
have been decided on the merits. Rather, they accused the majority of
usurping the power of the people, being destructive of democracy itself, and
attacking the sacred principle of religious freedom.49
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, began by
acknowledging a fundamental right to marry, but disputed that the right
"include[s] a right to make a State change its definition of marriage."o He
pointed out that advocates of same-sex marriage have had "considerable
success [in recent years] persuading their fellow citizens-through the
democratic process-to adopt their view.""1 "Five lawyers," i.e., the
Justices in the majority, have closed off that democratic process in "an act
of will, not legal judgment."S2 Citing Windsor, he correctly noted that "[t]he
Constitution itself says nothing about marriage, and the Framers thereby
entrusted the States with '[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife."'53 He asserted that the majority's reasoning was based
upon two of the most reviled and repudiated decisions in our constitutional
history: Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857),54 and Lochner v. New York (1905).s
The Chief Justice raised the question of whether restrictions on plural
marriage can survive under the majority's reasoning: "Although the
majority randomly inserts the adjective 'two' in various places, it offers no
reason at all why the two-person element of the core definition of marriage
may be preserved while the man-woman element may not." 56 He described
the majority's approach as "dangerous for the rule of law.", 7
Addressing religious freedom, he pointed out that the First
Amendment's guarantee is "the freedom to 'exercise' religion," not merely
to teach and advocate religious principles, and that the majority
49. Id at 2611-12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2640-43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
50. Id., at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id at 2612.
53. Id. at 2613-14 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013)).
54. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (striking down the Missouri Compromise on slavery and ruling
that people of African descent are not citizens and have no rights).
55. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905) (striking down a New York statute limiting
the work week in a bakery to 60 hours).
56. Id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
57. 1d at 2622.
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"[o]minously" failed to use that word.s8 He bemoaned the lack of
accommodations for religious practice enunciated by the majority, and
pointed to an acknowledgement by the Solicitor General of the United
States at oral argument that some religious institutions might lose their taxexempt status if they opposed same-sex marriage.5 9
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, attacked the majority with his
usual hyperbolic language, saying the majority's decision constituted a
"threat to American democracy." 60 It lacked "even a thin veneer of law"
and
consisted of "mummeries
and
straining-to-be-memorable
passages .... "61 Rather than join an opinion with language like that of the
majority, Scalia "would hide [his] head in a bag." 62 The Court has
descended "to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie." 63 The
majority's decision "robs the People of the most important liberty they
asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of
1776: the freedom to govern themselves."64
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, echoed the same themes,
although he used more temperate language. The majority's decision was a
"distortion of our Constitution . . . ."65 "By straying from the text of the
Constitution, substantive due process exalts judges at the expense of the
People from whom they derive their authority."66 He cited the Magna Carta,
Blackstone, and the Framers (of the Constitution) for the proposition that
the word "liberty," as used in the Fifth Amendment, merely means
"freedom from physical restraint. "67 Same-sex couples denied the right to
marry have not been deprived of such liberty nor of "freedom from
governmental action more broadly ... ."68 Rather, the states have merely
"refused to grant them governmental entitlements." 69 The "decision
threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect,"70 and
it is "all but inevitable" that such liberty and the right of same-sex marriage
"will come into conflict, particularly as individuals and churches are

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 2625.
Id. at 2625-26.
Id at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2628.
Id. at 2630 n.22.
Id.
Id. at 2627.
Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id
Id. at 2633.
Id. at 2635.
Id
Id at 2638.
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confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages
between same-sex couples." 7
Finally, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, also
bemoaned that "[tioday's decision usurps the constitutional right of the
people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional understanding of
marriage." 72 "[AIll Americans, whatever their thinking on [same-sex
marriage], should worry about what the majority's claim of power
portends."7 3
II. THE FALLOUT FROM OBERGEFELL (AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN
GENERAL)

It was inevitable that the Obergefell decision, whichever side won,
would produce strong reactions. As set forth in detail in the first part of this
Article, the issue of same-sex marriage had been increasingly argued,
litigated, and legislated over the prior two decades. 74 All sides agree that
marriage has a central role in our society," and any decision affecting the
rights of large numbers of previously excluded people to enter into that
institution is momentous. 6 Even had the Court spoken with one voice, it
would not have put the matter to rest.
Consider the Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia in 1967," ruling
that states may not prohibit interracial marriage. At the time of that
decision, there were still 16 states that prohibited and punished interracial
marriage. It would take 33 years, a full third of a century, before the last
of those states, Alabama, managed to repeal its unenforceable
"miscegenation" statute,7 9 and when that was finally done by popular
referendum in 2000, over 40% of Alabamians voted to maintain the ban.80
As recently as November 2009, a Louisiana justice of the peace resigned

7 1. Id.
72. Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2643.
74. See supra Part I (discussing and analyzing the evolution of the case law surrounding samesex marriage leading up to Obergefell).
75. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil
rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942))).
76. Id.
77. See id at 12 (explaining that the freedom to marry a person of another race rests with the
person, not the state).
78. Id. at 6.
79. Tom Head, InterracialMarriage Laws History & Timeline, THOUGHTCO. (Aug. 12, 2017),
https://www.thoughtco.com/interracial-marriage-laws-721611/.
80. Id.
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rather than having to perform an interracial marriage, saying, "I found out I
can't be a justice of the peace and have a conscience."" And, unlike
Obergefell, the Loving decision was unanimous; Loving did not have four
Justices, including the Chief Justice, filing strongly worded dissents
indicating that the Court had made an unprincipled power grab, destructive
of democracy and religious liberty.82
A. ControllingPrecedent
Undoubtedly the easiest legal question to answer post-Obergefell
should have been whether that decision constitutes precedent that is binding
on lower federal courts and on the states, generally. Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution (the Supremacy Clause) provides, "[t]his Constitution ... shall
be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding."" In the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803, the
Court announced that, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." 84 In 1958, in Cooper v. Aaron,
involving the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock,
Arkansas, the Court unanimously rejected the argument that the governor
and legislature of that state were not bound by the Court's rulings.8 1 "No
state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the
Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.", 6 Yet, that is
precisely what has happened after Obergefell in Puerto Rico, Alabama, and
other jurisdictions.
In Puerto Rico, in the case of Conde- Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla,decided
in 2014 before Obergefell, federal district judge Prez-Gim6nez had upheld
Puerto Rico's statutory ban on same-sex marriage." This was not

81. LouisianaJustice Who Refused InterracialMarriageResigns, CNN (Nov. 3, 2009, 10:47
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/1 1/03/louisiana.interracial.marriage/index.html.
82. Compare Loving, 388 U.S. at 2 (writing for a unanimous court, the Chief Justice's opinion
held a miscegenation statute unconstitutional), with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (leading the dissenters, the Chief Justice wrote a scathing rebuttal joined by
three other justices).
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
84. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
85. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4, 9 (1958).
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id.
88. See Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 54 F. Supp. 3d 157, 158, 168 (D.P.R. 2014) (dismissing
the plaintiffs claim that Article 68 unlawfully violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses,
because it recognized marriage only as between a man and a woman), vacated sub nom., Conde-Vidal v.
Rius-Armendariz, No. 14-2184, 2015 WL 10574261 (1st Cir. July 8, 2015).
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problematic because neither its circuit court of appeals (the First Circuit)
nor the Supreme Court had yet spoken directly on the issue." But within
days of the Obergefell decision, the First Circuit vacated the district court's
judgment and remanded the case, noting that it agreed "with the parties'
joint position that the ban is unconstitutional." 90 This should have been the
end of the matter, but it was not. On remand, despite Obergefell, the First
Circuit's ruling, and the fact that the parties to the case had filed a joint
motion for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Judge PdrezGim6nez again upheld the statutory ban, finding that Puerto Rico was not
bound by the Supreme Court's decision." Within a month, the First Circuit
again reversed, stating that "[t]he district court's ruling errs in so many
respects that it is hard to know where to begin."92 The circuit court
remanded the case with instructions that it be reassigned to a different
district court judge to enter judgment promptly for plaintiffs.93
It should not be thought that the issue of Obergefell as controlling
precedent has been otherwise uniformly acknowledged by the judiciary. In
a same-sex divorce case discussed below, two justices of the Mississippi
Supreme Court opined in dissent that Obergefell does not stand as
legitimate legal authority because, citing Chief Justice Roberts' dissent, it
"has no basis in the Constitution or [United States Supreme Court]
precedent." 94 They further relied on a "Statement Calling for Constitutional
Resistance to Obergefell v. Hodges," issued by the American Principles
Project and signed by various prominent legal academics.9 5
B. Issuance ofMarriageLicenses: Precedentand Religious Objection
Marriage licenses are normally issued by a low-level county or state
employee who may be called a county clerk or some other ministerial
89. Christopher Coble, U.S. District Judge Upholds Puerto Rico Ban on Same-Sex Marriage,
FINDLAW: COURTSIDE (Mar. 10, 2016, 1:57 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/courtside/2016/03/usdistrict-judge-upholds-puerto-rico-ban-on-same-sex-marriage.html.
90. Conde-Vidal v. Rius-Armendariz, No. 14-2184, 2015 WL 10574261, at *1 (1st Cir. July 8,
2015).
91. Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 167 F. Supp. 3d 279, 280, 287 (D.P.R. 2016).
92. In re Conde Vidal, 818 F.3d 765, 766 (1st Cir. 2016).
93. Id. at 767.
94. Czekala-Chatham v. State ex rel. Hood, 195 So. 3d 187, 199 (Miss. 2015) (en banc)
(Coleman, J., dissenting) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting)).
95. Statement Callingfor Constitutional Resistance to Obergefell v. Hodges, AQUILA REP.
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://theaquilareport.com/statement-calling-for-constitutional-resistance-to-obergefellv-hodges%E2%80%AF/. One of the signatories to this document recently informed the author that he
has abandoned this position and now recognizes that Supreme Court authority, however distasteful to
him, is binding.
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title.96 Thus, in Pennsylvania, for example, marriage licenses are issued at

the county level. 97 A couple applies by filling out a detailed application
form and paying a fee. 98 There is a rather perfunctory oral examination to
ascertain whether the couple is eligible to marry, and, assuming they are,
the license is issued after a three-day waiting period (subject to
exceptions). 99 Although issued at the county level, it is a state license
authorizing the parties to be married anywhere within the state.'o
In Alabama, notorious Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy
Moore (he had previously been removed from the same office for violating
a federal court order in another matter)' 0 ' asserted that he and the state are
not necessarily bound by Obergefell, and he therefore ordered state probate
judges not to issue licenses to same-sex couples.' 02 Prior to Obergefell, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama had
declared unconstitutional Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage.' 03 Despite
the Supremacy Clause, the Alabama Supreme Court issued a decision in
another case upholding the ban.' 04 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
subsequent Obergefell ruling, as well as subsequent orders from the federal
district court, Chief Justice Moore continued to direct Alabama probate
judges not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.'o In an
"administrative order," issued January 6, 2016, Moore asserted that the U.S.
Supreme Court's Obergefell decision has caused "[c]onfusion and
uncertainty [to] exist among the probate judges" as to whether to obey that
decision, 0 6 bizarrely citing four federal court decisions, all of which held
that Obergefell dictates that state laws barring same-sex marriage are
unconstitutional.o7 Moore reiterated that "the existing orders of the
96. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (1990) (describing that,in Pennsylvania, the clerk is the
personnel of the office that has jurisdiction).
97. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1104 (1990) (stating that all forms are processed by the county
throughout the entire commonwealth).
98. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1302(b) (2005); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1105(a) (1990).
99. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303(a) (2005), 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1306 (2006).
100. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301(b) (1990).
101. Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 891 So. 2d 848, 862 (Ala. 2004).
102. Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Judge, Suspended Over Gay Marriage Stance,
N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/us/judge-roy-moore-alabama-samesex-marriage.html.
103. Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1286 (S.D. Ala. 2015).
104. Ex Parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst. (API), 200 So. 3d. 495, 552 (Ala. 2015).
105. Administrative Order of the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, at 4 (Jan. 6,
2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/roymoore-adminorder jan6-2016.pdf
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 3 (first citing Jernigan v. Crane, 796 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2015); then citing Waters v.
Ricketts, 798 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2015); then citing Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, 799 F.3d 918 (8th Cir.
2015); and then citing Marie v. Mosier, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D. Kan. 2015)).
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Alabama Supreme Court that Alabama probate judges have a ministerial
duty not to issue any marriage license [to same-sex couples] . . . remain[s]
in full force and effect." 10 8 As a result of Moore's continued refusal to
adhere to binding federal law, the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission
filed ethics charges against him on May 6, 2016,109 and he was
automatically suspended from office pending a resolution of the matter. 110
On September 30, 2016, after a hearing on the matter, the Commission
suspended Moore from office for the remainder of his term for his
continued defiance of binding precedent from the Supreme Court.' While
Moore continued to fight his removal before a specially empaneled
Alabama Supreme Court, 112 he announced that he would run for the seat
left vacant in the U.S. Senate when Jeff Sessions became Attorney
General. 113
Shortly after Obergefell was handed down, the issue arose as to
whether an individual county clerk, or an entire county clerk's office, may
refuse to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples on religious grounds.
The most highly publicized case was that of Kim Davis, the elected county
clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky.' 14 Davis, a self-proclaimed Apostolic
Christian, professes a sincerely held religious objection to same-sex
marriage."'s Davis announced within hours of the Obergefell ruling that her
108. Id. at 4.
109. See Robertson, supra note 102 (discussing how Chief Justice Moore blatantly abused his
authority by disregarding Obergefell, and issuing an administrative order instructing probate judges to
enforce the state's same-sex marriage ban).
110. Id.
111. See Alabama ChiefJustice Roy Moore off Bench for Defying Feds on Same-Sex Marriage,
CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2016, 12:35 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/alabama-chief-justice-roymoore-suspended-defying-feds-same-sex-marriage/ (reporting that Moore was forced from the bench for
his continued and outright refusal to recognize the binding effect of Obergefell).
12. See Chip Brownlee, Chief Justice Files Reply Brief in JudicialEthics Appeal, ALA. POL.
REP. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.alreporter.com/2017/02/02/chief-justice-files-reply-brief-in-judicialethics-appeal/ (stating that Moore filed a final brief with the Alabama Supreme Court, argued that the
Court of the Judiciary had no authority to review his contentious Administrative Order, and declared
that power rests solely with the Alabama Supreme Court).
113. Jenny Jarvie, SuspendedAlabama ChiefJustice Roy Moore is Runningfor Senate to 'Make
America Good Again', L.A. TIMtEs (Apr. 26, 2017, 6:05 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-naalabama-senate-moore-20170426-story.html.
114. See Colin Dwyer, Gay Couple's Lawsuit Against Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis Is Back On
After Court Ruling, NAT'L PuB. RADIO (May 3, 2017, 2:19 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/05/03/526615385/gay-couples-lawsuit-against-kentucky-clerk-is-back-on-after-appeals-courtruling (stating that Kim Davis "grabbed headlines in 2015").
115. Many have questioned Davis's bona fides as an advocate for the sanctity of traditional
marriage as she has been divorced three times, married four times, and had twins out of wedlock. See
Revealed: Kentucky Clerk Refusing to Issue Gay Marriage Licenses Has Been MarriedFOUR Times
and Gave Birth to Twins Out of Wedlock, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 2, 2015, 11:19 AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3219147/Kentucky-clerk-Kim-Davis-married-FOUR-times-
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office would no longer issue marriage licenses to any couples. 116 Four of
her deputies shared her religious objection, and another was undecided on
the issue.117 The remaining deputy was willing to issue same-sex marriage
licenses, but Davis forbade it because her name would appear on them."'
Davis was acting in contravention of two directives from Governor Beshear
to all county clerks directing them to issue same-sex marriage licenses, and:
[I]f you are at that point to where your personal convictions tell
you that you simply cannot fulfill your duties that you were
elected to do, th[e]n obviously an honorable course to take is to
resign and let someone else step in who feels that they can fulfill
those duties. 119

Several couples, including an opposite-sex couple, sued Davis in
federal district court and sought a preliminary injunction ordering her to
issue marriage licenses, arguing that her policy substantially interfered with
their right to marry because it prevented them from getting licenses in their
home county.120 Davis argued that her right to free exercise of religion
trumped the interference with their right to marry, which was "incidental,"
since they could obtain licenses in several surrounding counties.121
On August 12, 2015, federal district court judge David Bunning issued
a preliminary injunction against Davis, which was subsequently upheld by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 1 22 The U.S. Supreme Court denied a
stay on August 31, 2015,123 and, after Davis refused to comply, Judge
Bunning jailed her for contempt. 124 Five days later, Judge Bunning released
her from jail, after finding that five of her deputies were issuing marriage
licenses as promised under oath, on condition that she not interfere with the

gave-birth-wedlock.html (reporting court records showing she gave birth to twins after the first of three
divorces).
116. Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 929 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
117. Id. at 932.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Governor Beshear).
120. Id at 929-30.
121. Id at 929, 935.
122. Id at 924, 929, 944 (granting the preliminary injunction); Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880,
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 23060, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2015) (denying motion to stay the preliminary
injunction).
123. Davis v. Miller, 136 S. Ct. 23, 23 (2015) (mem.).
124. Defiant Ky. Clerk Jailed in Same-Sex Marriage Fight, 84 U.S.L.W. No. 8, at 310 (Sept. 8,
2015).
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efforts of her deputies to issue those licenses. 125 Davis's release became a
big media event, with two prominent Republican candidates for President,
Mike Huckabee and Ted Cruz, in attendance to support her. 126 It is clear
that Davis publicly proclaimed victory and defiance while quietly accepting
defeat. 127 In July 2017, Judge Bunning further ordered Kentucky to pay the
attorneys who had sued Davis over her refusal to issue the licenses over
$200,000 in fees. 1 28
In a less well-publicized case, Linda Summers, an Indiana deputy
county clerk, refused to input data for a same-sex couple to be issued a
marriage license in defiance of a memorandum from the Office of the
Indiana Attorney General after Indiana's ban on same-sex marriage had
been struck down by the federal court pre-Obergefell.129 Her boss, Sally
Whitis, the elected county clerk, directed Summers to do her job, but she
still refused.o As a direct result, Whitis fired Summers, who proceeded to
file a federal civil rights action against Whitis, claiming religious
discrimination.13 1 In December 2016, the court dismissed the lawsuit,
reasoning that Summers was not fired for her religious beliefs, but for
failure to carry out the duties of her job. 13 2
After lower court rulings issued prior to Obergefell required North
Carolina to permit same-sex marriage, its state legislature enacted a

125. Andrew Wolfson, Ky. Clerk Kim Davis Thanks Supporters on Release From Jail, USA
TODAY (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/09/08/kim-davis-releasedjail/71882274/.
126. Alan Blinder & Richard Pdrez-Pefla, Kim Davis, Released From Kentucky Jail, Won't Say
IfShe Will Keep Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/09/us/ki
m-davis-same-sex-marriage.html.
127. In a similar vein, shortly after the Supreme Court's ruling, Texas Attorney General Ken
Paxton declared that county clerks may refuse to grant marriage licenses on grounds of religious
objections. See Sam Frizell, Texas Attorney GeneralDefies Same-Sex Marriage Ruling, TIME (June 29,
2015), http://time.com/3939652/texas-attomey-general-same-sex-marriage/ (reporting that the Texas
Attorney General did not believe the Court was faithful to the Constitution).
128.

Kentucky Taxpayers Ordered to Pay $222,695 in Attorney Fees in Same-Sex Marriage

Case, FLA. TIMES-UNION (July 25, 2017, 11:51 AM), http://jacksonville.com/news/national/2017-0725/kentucky-taxpayers-ordered-pay-222695-attomey-fees-same-sex-marriage-case/; see also Ermold v.
Davis, 855 F.3d 715, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that the plaintiffs' damages claim was not mooted
by the Governor's signing of Senate Bill 216, which amended the Kentucky marriage license issuance
process to no longer require that county clerks' names appear on the forms).
129. Summers v. Whitis, No. 4:15-cv-00093, 2016 WL 7242483, at *1-2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 15,
2016).
130. Id. at *1.
131. Id.
132. See id at *7-8 (granting Whitis's motion for summary judgment).
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"Religious Freedom Restoration Act" in 2015 over the Governor's veto,1 33
which provided inter alia that:
Every assistant register of deeds and deputy register of deeds has
the right to recuse from issuing all lawful marriage licenses under
this Chapter based upon any sincerely held religious objection.
Such recusal shall be upon notice to the register of deeds and is
in effect for at least six months from the time delivered to the
register of deeds. The recusing assistant or deputy register may
not issue any marriage license until the recusal is rescinded in
writing. The register of deeds shall ensure for all applicants for
marriage licenses to be issued a license upon satisfaction of the
requirements as set forth in Article 2 of this Chapter. 134
Thus, it appears that in North Carolina an assistant or deputy register of
deeds may refuse on religious grounds to issue marriage licenses,' but he
or she cannot do so selectively and issue licenses to some eligible couples
and not to others.1 36 Moreover, the register of deeds does not enjoy such a
religious exemption.' 37
C. Judges Performing Wedding Ceremonies and HearingAdoption Cases
It is typical that a state marriage law will list various categories of civil
officials who can solemnize marriages, in addition to members of the
clergy."' These officials may include current and former state and federal
judges, as well as mayors and other more or less prominent officials. 139 As
with issuance of marriage licenses, the question quickly arose as to whether
judges who are authorized by state law to perform weddings may opt not to

133. Ansley v. Warren, No. 1:16-cv-00054, 2016 WL 5213937, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 20,
2016), af'd by 861 F.3d 512 (4th Cir. 2017).
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-5.5(b) (2015).
135. Id.
136. See id (providing assistant or deputy register of deeds the opportunity to recuse themselves
from "issuing all lawful marriage licenses . . . ." (emphasis added)).
137. See id § 51-5.5(d) (granting religious exclusions only to magistrates, assistant register of
deeds, and deputy register of deeds).
138. See Robert E. Rains, Marriage in the Time of Internet Ministers: I Now Pronounce You
Married, But Who Am I To Do So?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REv. 809, 838 (2010) (providing examples of the
many different officials approved by state laws to solemnize marriages).
139. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1503(a) (1990) (listing the persons qualified to solemnize
marriages).
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perform same-sex weddings.140 There is currently a split of (nonbinding)
authority on the subject. 14 1
Within three days of the Obergefell decision, the Nebraska Judicial
Ethics Committee issued an advisory opinion that a judge or clerk
magistrate who performs marriages may not refuse to perform same-sex
marriages. 14 2 Such refusal would manifest "bias or prejudice based on
sexual orientation" in violation of the Nebraska Revised Code of Judicial
Conduct. 143 Referring the couple to another judge who would perform the
marriage would not solve the problem, as that would likewise demonstrate
bias.' 4 4 However, "[a] judge or clerk magistrate may avoid such personal or
religious conflicts by refusing to perform all marriages, because the
performance of marriage ceremonies is an extrajudicial activity and not a
mandatory duty."i4 1
In August 2015, the Supreme Court of Ohio Board of Professional
Conduct issued an even stronger Advisory Opinion on the subject. 14 6 "A
judge's unilateral decision to refuse to perform same-sex marriages based
on his or her own personal, religious, or moral beliefs ignores the holding in
Obergefell and thus, directly contravenes the oath of office." 1 47 Nor,
contrary to the Nebraska opinion, if the judge had been performing
marriages prior to Obergefell, could he or she simply stop performing them:
Regardless of whether the statutes authorizing the performance of
civil marriages are deemed mandatory or permissive, the statutes
reflect the legislative intent to grant citizens the opportunity to
obtain a civil marriage from designated public officials.... A
judge who takes the position that he or she will discontinue
performing all marriages, in order to avoid marrying same-sex
couples based on his or her personal, moral, or religious beliefs,

140. Gabrielle Banks, Jayme Fraser & Mihir Zaveri, Some Judges Stop Officiating Marriages
After Same-Sex Ruling, Hous. CHRON. (Aug. 26, 2015, 2:21 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/ne
ws/houston-texas/houston/article/Some-judges-stop-officiating-marriages-after-6465325.php.
141. Anne Blythe, NC Same-Sex Marriage Dispute Revived After FederalRuling, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Nov. 6, 2014, 1:55 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article9228818.html.
142. Neb. Jud. Ethics Comm., Op. 15-1, 1, 3 (2015), https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/site
s/default/files/ethics-opinions/Judicia/15-10.pdf
143. Id. at 1-2.
144. Id. at 2.
145. Id.
146. Ohio Bd. of Prof. Conduct, Op. 2015-1, 7 (2015), https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boar
ds/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/2015/Op_15-001.pdf
147. Id. at 3.
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may be interpreted as manifesting an improper bias or prejudice
toward a particular class. 148
Less than two weeks later, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin Judicial
Conduct Advisory Committee issued an opinion in line with that of
Nebraska.149 While a judicial officer who performs marriages cannot
decline to do so for same-sex couples, he or she may simply decline to
perform any marriages since "the performance of marriage ceremonies by
judicial officers is a discretionary versus mandatory duty of those
officers.""so
The North Carolina Religious Freedom Restoration Act, referenced
above, permits individual magistrates to refuse to conduct marriages based
on any sincerely held religious belief in opposition to same-sex marriage."'
The statute further provides that if all the magistrates in a given county
refuse to perform marriages, the North Carolina Administrative Office of
the Courts (NCAOC) will arrange to bring in a willing magistrate from
another county to perform marriages.' 52 When three couples sued in federal
court challenging these provisions,153 alleging that the state had expended
taxpayer money bringing out-of-county magistrates into a county where no
magistrate would perform marriages, 5 4 the federal district court dismissed
their complaint for lack of standing, and the Fourth Circuit has upheld that
dismissal. "'
In late April 2017, a Kentucky family court judge, W. Mitchell Nance,
issued an order, stating that "he will recuse himself from adoption cases
involving 'homosexual parties . . . ."'156 He asserted that this was "'a matter

148. Id. at 6-7.
149. See Wis. Jud. Conduct Advisory Comm., Op. 15-1, 1 (2015), https://www.wicourts.gov/sc
/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdfcontent=pdf&seqNo=146878 (stating that "a judicial officer" may not
"decline to be the 'officiating person' at the marriage of two persons of the same sex" based on "his or
her own religious or personal beliefs").
150. Id. at 4.
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-5.5(a) (2015).
152. Id. § 51-5.5(c).
153. Ansley v. Warren, 861 F.3d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 2017).
154. Id. at 516.
155. Id.
156. Terry Carter, Kentucky Judge Recuses Himselffrom All Adoption Cases Involving SameSex Partners,A.B.A. (May 1, 2017, 12:34 PM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/kentucky judg
e recuses himself from adoption cases involvingsame sexjyartn/?utm source=-maestro&utmmedi
um=email&utm campaign=weeklyemail (quoting Andrew Wolfson, Judge Says He Won't Hear Gay
Adoptions Because It CouldNever Be in Child's Best Interest, COURER-J. (Apr. 28, 2017, 1:07 PM),
http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2017/04/28/judge-says-he-wont-hear-gay-adoptionsbecause-could-never-childs-best-interest/307579001/).
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of conscience' because [] 'under no circumstance' would 'the best interest
of the child be promoted by the adoption by a practicing homosexual.""
D. Other GovernmentalBenefits (andDetriments)
With all the controversies involving governmental officials carrying
out their duties toward same-sex couples, it is worthwhile to consider some
of the many governmental benefits (and sometimes detriments) that flow
from same-sex marriage. In the various state court cases addressing samesex marriage prior to Obergefell, it was common for judges to allude to or
list some of the various economic and legal rights that flow from state and
federal recognition of a marriage, above and beyond any intangible benefits
such as emotional commitment.' Thus, for example, in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health,159 the Massachusetts decision that led to the
state becoming the first to allow same-sex marriage, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court (MSJC) stated: "The benefits accessible only by
way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of
life and death. The department states that 'hundreds of statutes' are related
to marriage and to marital benefits."160
"With no attempt to be comprehensive," the MSJC then referenced
property ownership, income taxation, homestead protection, inheritance
rights, business rights, health insurance, pensions, etc.16' Similarly, in
United States v. Windsor, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) case
which itself involved federal estate taxation, the U.S. Supreme Court
referenced multiple federal rights and duties flowing from federal
recognition of a marriage,16 2 including non-dischargeability of domestic
support obligations under the Bankruptcy Code, burial rights for spouses of
veterans, federal taxation, dependents' Social Security benefits, etc.163 The
Windsor decision, striking down Section 3 of federal DOMA, meant that
the federal government would, in most instances, recognize as married
same-sex couples who were validly married according to the law of their

-

157. Id. (quoting Wolfson, supra note 156).
158. See, e.g., Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 888 (N.M. 2013) (alluding to "federal and state
benefits and protections" flowing from civil marriage); Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 220, 744 A.2d 864,
883-84 (Vt. 1999) (listing the "benefits and protections" afforded by civil marriage); Lewis v. Harris,
908 A.2d 196, 215-16 (N.J. 2006) (outlining the "rights afforded to married couples").
159. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage violated the Massachusetts Constitution).
160. Id. at 955.
161. Id. at 955-56.
162. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
163. Id at 2694.

210

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 42:191

state.1 64 Hence, Edie Windsor was entitled to a refund of the federal estate
tax she had had to pay upon her spouse's death. 165
It is worth mentioning that another case involving a same-sex couple
was decided by the Supreme Court after Obergefell, but that case did not
involve a marriage. In VL. v. E.L., two Alabama women were in a longterm relationship, during which one of them had three children (whom the
two women raised together) through assisted reproduction technology.1 66
During the relationship they rented a house in Georgia so the other woman
could adopt the children there, as they were unable to have a same-sex
adoption in Alabama. 167 At some time after the adoption, the women split
up, and the mother who had given birth denied her former partner access to
the children.16' The former partner sued in Alabama, asking the Alabama
court to register the Georgia adoption judgment and grant her "some
measure of custody or visitation" (access) with the children. 169 The trial
court granted the relief requested, but on appeal the Alabama Supreme
Court ruled that the Georgia adoption decree was invalid because the
Georgia court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. 17 0
In a brief, per curiam opinion, issued in March 2016, the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously reversed."' The Court ruled that Alabama was bound
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitutionl72 to give legal
effect to the Georgia court's adoption decree. 173 Because the two women
were never married in any jurisdiction, the Court had no occasion to
reference either Windsor or Obergefell.
In another visitation (access) case in state court with similar facts,
Obergefell had a direct bearing and indeed dictated the result. In Stankevich
v. Milliron, two Michigan women had been married in Canada in 2007.174
One had been artificially inseminated and had a child whom the two women

164. Id. at 2695-96.
165. Id. at 2686.
166. V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2016) (per curiam).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id at 1019-20.
171. Id at 1022 (finding jurisdiction was proper and stating that there was "no established
Georgia law to the contrary"). Justice Scalia died in February 2016, so it is impossible to know whether
he would have joined the decision. See Jamie Gangel et al., Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court Justice, Dies
at 79, CNN (Feb. 15, 2016, 7:22 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/13/politics/supreme-court-justiceantonin-scalia-dies-at-79/index.html (chronicling the life of Justice Antonin Scalia and his conservative
opinions).
172. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
173. V.L., 136 S. Ct. at 1019, 1022.
174. Stankevich v. Milliron, 882 N.W.2d 194, 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
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'

raised together.1 75 After the women separated, the biological mother denied
her former partner access to the child, and the former partner sued. 176The
Michigan courts initially denied her suit because she had not adopted the
child, and Michigan did not recognize the Canadian same-sex marriage.177
But, after the Obergefell decision, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded
the case to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which reversed itself and ruled
that Obergefell dictated that Michigan recognize the Canadian marriage,
giving the former partner standing to proceed with her claim. 178
Obergefell also directly implicates adoption rights for same-sex
couples, which were allowed in some states,17 9 but prohibited in others. In
Campaign for Southern Equality v. Mississippi Department of Human
Services, a federal district court struck down Mississippi's statutory ban on
adoptions by same-sex couples, relying directly on Obergefell's reasoning
that same-sex couples cannot be deprived of "marriage-related benefits."'
"It .. . seems highly unlikely that the same court that held a state cannot
ban gay marriage because it would deny benefits-expressly including the
right to adopt-would then conclude that married gay couples can be
denied that very same benefit."' 8
Additionally, Obergefell has been used, properly, to attack states that
have refused to list same-sex spouses on death certificates as surviving
spouses 182 and on birth certificates as second parents.183 A federal court in
Indiana has applied Obergefell to order the state to recognize children born
to a birth mother in a same-sex marriage as being born in wedlock and to
list her spouse as the other parent.1 84 However, in December 2016, the

175. Id
176. Id.
177. Id. at 196.
178. Id. at 196, 199. A similar result was reached in McLaughlin v. Jones, 382 P.3d 118, 119-20
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2016), in which the biological mother unsuccessfully tried to deny parental rights to her
estranged wife whom she had married in California in 2008.
179. See In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1196-97, 1202 (Pa. 2002) (holding that a
legal parent is not required to relinquish parental rights in cases where a same-sex partner seeks to adopt
the legal parent's child).
180. Campaign for S. Equal. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 175 F. Supp. 3d 691, 710 (S.D. Miss.
2016).
181. Id.
182. Birchfield v. Armstrong, No. 4:15-cv-00615, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56276, at *7-8 (N.D.
Fla. Mar. 23, 2017) (holding that same-sex surviving spouse, upon presenting proper documentation,
must be permitted to amend death certificate without the need for a court order).
183. See Brandi Grissom, Texas to Allow Gay Spouses' Names on Birth, Death Certicates,

DALL. MORNING NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/headlines/20150810
-texas-to-allow-gay-spouses-names-on-birth-death-certificates.ece (reporting a successful challenge to
Texas's policy against same-sex spouses on birth and death certificates).
184. Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1079 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
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Supreme Court of Arkansas reached a contrary conclusion in the case of
Smith v. Pavan based on a narrow reading of Obergefell.8 5 That decision
did not stand long. In June 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified this issue
in a per curiam decision, summarily reversing the Arkansas Supreme Court,
stating:
As this Court explained in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Constitution
entitles same-sex couples to civil marriage "on the same terms
and conditions as opposite-sex couples." In the decision below,
the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the effect of that holding
on the State's rules governing the issuance of birth certificates.
When a married woman gives birth in Arkansas, state law
generally requires the name of the mother's male spouse to
appear on the child's birth certificate-regardless of his
biological relationship to the child. According to the court below,
however, Arkansas need not extend that rule to similarly situated
same-sex couples: The State need not, in other words, issue birth
certificates including the female spouses of women who give
birth in the State. Because that differential treatment infringes
Obergefell's commitment to provide same-sex couples "the
constellation of benefits that the States have linked to
marriage," we reverse the state court's judgment.1 86
It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberts, who had dissented in
Obergefell, joined the majority in Pavan." Newly confirmed Justice
Gorsuch dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. 8
In Kansas, a federal district court utilized Obergefell to enjoin state
officials from, inter alia, refusing to allow same-sex married couples to file
joint state tax returns as married persons, refusing to allow a member of a
same-sex married couple to obtain a driver's license in her married name,

185. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 183 (Ark. 2016). In a rather unusual move, Arkansas
Chief Justice Brill began his partial dissent quoting from Nobel Laureate Bob Dylan's song, "The Times
They Are a-Changin."' Id (quoting BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin',on THE TIMEs THEY
ARE A-CHANGIN' (Columbia Records 1964)).
186. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2076-77 (2017) (per curiam); see also Ayala v.
Armstrong, No. 1:16-cv-00501-BLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137277, at *1-3, *14 (internal citations
omitted) ¶(D. Idaho Aug. 24, 2017) (granting permanent injunction to former same-sex partner to be
listed on birth certificate where state law had prevented the parties' marriage).
187. Compare Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (striking down differential treatment of same-sex
spouses, with a dissenting opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, with whom only Justices Thomas and
Alito joined), with Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(disputing that the fundamental right to marry requires a state to change its definition of marriage).
188. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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and refusing to add same-sex spouses to a state employee's healthcare
plan. 189
The right to divorce is implicated, as well. Prior to Obergefell, some
states that did not recognize same-sex marriage had refused to grant
divorces to individuals who had entered into a same-sex marriage out of
state on the theory that to do so would be to recognize the marriage.190
While Obergefell was pending, just such a case was working its way
through the Mississippi state court system. 191 A woman who had been
lawfully married to another woman in California sought and was denied a
divorce in Mississippi based on Mississippi's ban on same-sex marriage.1 92
In November 2015, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed because
Obergefell mandated that result. 193 More recently, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court ruled that two women, who had entered into a civil union in
Vermont, could proceed with a divorce action in Pennsylvania, reasoning
that a Vermont civil union should be considered the legal equivalent of a
marriage under the Pennsylvania Divorce Code. 194
Further, Obergefell has implications for restrictions on marriage for
opposite-sex couples. In Riker v. Lemmon, a former prison cafeteria worker
who lost her job and was barred from the prison after it was discovered that
she had violated prison policy by engaging in a romantic relationship with a
prisoner, subsequently sought permission to marry the inmate.1 95 That
permission was denied largely based on security concerns, and she sued in
federal court, seeking inter alia "a single visit to the institution, of a short
duration, for the limited purpose of marrying her fianc6."196 In a decision
issued before the Court decided Obergefell, the district court denied all
relief, pertinently reasoning that the burden on Ms. Riker's right to marry
was not substantial or direct because she "has not been absolutely prevented
from marrying a large portion of the eligible population of spouses."197
After the Obergefell decision, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and

189. Marie v. Mosier, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1112-13 (D. Kan. 2015).
190. See Robert E. Rains, A MinimalistApproach to Same-Sex Divorce, UTAH L. REV. 393, 413,
415-16 (2012) (describing cases where a same-sex divorce was refused because the reciprocal right to
same-sex marriage was not recognized by that state).
191. Czekala-Chatham v. State ex rel. Hood, 195 So. 3d 187, 187 (Miss. 2015) (en banc).
192. Id. at 196.
193. Id at 187.
194. Neyman v. Buckley, 153 A.3d 1010, 1011 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
195. Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2015).
196. Id. at 550-51.
197. Riker v. Lemmon, No. 1:13-cv-00571, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *21-23 (S.D.
Ind. July 30, 2014) (dismissing the complaint), rev'd, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015).
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remanded the case, citing Obergefell for the proposition that "[t]he right to
marry includes the right to select one's spouse." 1 9 8
In a somewhat similar case, the Eastern District of Kentucky ruled that
a county clerk could not refuse to grant a marriage license on the grounds
that the man's intended wife could not appear at the clerk's office in person
because of her incarceration.199 Likewise, the Eastern District of Louisiana
ruled that the state could not deny a marriage license to an opposite-sex
couple simply because the man, who was a refugee, had never been issued a
birth certificate by any country.2 00
It should not be supposed that state or federal recognition of marriage
always confers benefits on one or both of the parties. The Windsor opinion
provided some examples of detriments and duties.201 Thus, "federal law
takes into consideration a spouse's, income in calculating a student's federal
financial aid eligibility," but until Windsor, this simply did not apply to
same-sex couples validly married under state law.202 Shortly after the
Obergefell decision, the Congressional Research Service issued a report on
the federal tax treatment of same-sex married couples.203 Among its
findings was that: "Marriage penalties are more likely among couples
where both partners earn similar incomes.... A couple where both partners
earn $100,000, having a combined income of $200,000, would experience a
marriage [income] tax penalty of $855."204 Moreover, "[m]arriage penalties
may be more likely for couples with children for several reasons" (largely
because of diminished eligibility for various tax credits).205
In short, and none too surprisingly, legal recognition of marriage is not
necessarily an unalloyed blessing for one or both of the partners. An
example of a situation in which one party to a same-sex union benefits, but
the other loses as a result of Obergefell, occurred recently in Kentucky.
Two women had entered into a civil union in New Jersey at a time when
198.
199.
200.
8,2017).
201.
202.

Riker, 798 F.3d at 555, 558 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015)).
Jones v. Perry, 215 F. Supp. 3d 563, 565 (E.D. Ky. 2016).
Viet Anh Vo v. Gee, No. 16-15639, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125016, *2-4 (E.D. La. Aug.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694-95 (2013).
Id at 2695.

203. See generally MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R43157, THE
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED SAME-SEX COUPLES (2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misclR4315

7.pdf (examining the broad-ranging tax implications of federally recognized same-sex marriage).
204. Id. at 5-6. In the vernacular, such couples are sometimes referred to as "DINK[s]," an
acronym of "Dual Income, No Kids." Melissa R. O'Rourke, The Status of Infertility Treatments and
Insurance Coverage: Some Hopes and Frustrations,37 S.D. L. REv. 343, 343 (1992).
205. CRANDALL-HOLLICK ET AL., supra note 203, at 7 (describing that penalties are more likely
for couples with children largely related to diminished eligibility for various tax credits, but also because
of changes in filing status).
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one of them was already pregnant.2 06 They agreed to name the nonbiological mother as the child's "father" on the birth certificate.20 7 The
parties filed for divorce in Kentucky. 20 8 After Obergefell was decided, the
trial court granted the divorce and ruled that the non-biological mother was
a legal parent, and ordered her to pay child support even though the parties
had produced an affidavit from a man stating that he was the biological
father. 209 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed as a matter of law and
equity. 210

E. Religious Exemptionsfor PrivatePersons and Companies
Probably the most contentious issues surrounding same-sex marriage
involve whether private individuals and companies can, primarily on
religious grounds, legally refuse to provide services they generally provide
to other couples.2 1 1 May a private chapel or other venue refuse to host a
same-sex wedding, a florist refuse to provide flowers, a bakery refuse to
bake a wedding cake, a professional photographer refuse to photograph the
reception, a transportation service refuse to rent a limo, a caterer refuse to
cater, a bridal boutique refuse to provide gowns,212 etc.? These issues were
already cropping up around the United States well before Obergefell in
those jurisdictions that permitted same-sex marriage, and they have since
escalated.213
No reasonable person would seriously contend that an American
religious body can be ordered by any civil authority to perform weddings in
violation of the tenets of that religion. Officiants in a church, mosque, or

206. Legg v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 837, 839 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 840 (finding that a father cannot be permitted in equity to claim a title inconsistent
with his past conduct, and if the appellate court were to hold otherwise it would deny equal legal
treatment to same-sex couples).
211. The U.S. Supreme Court, interpreting the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ruled
that a closely held corporation is a protected person that may exercise a religious objection to a federal
requirement-in that case, certain mandates under the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare"). Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762, 2785 (2014).
212. See Curtis M. Wong, Pennsylvania's W W Bridal Boutique Under Fire For Reportedly
Turning

Away

Lesbian

Brides-To-Be,

HUFFPOST:

QUEER

VOICES

(Feb.

2,

2016),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/1 1/ww-bridal-boutique-lesbia n 5668645.html (reporting on a
bridal salon that refused to help a lesbian couple seeking to purchase wedding gowns).
213. See, e.g., Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 33-34 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (describing a
venue owner who refused same-sex ceremony in 2012); Knapp v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 172 F. Supp.
3d 1118, 1120 (D. Idaho 2016) (involving private chapel who owners challenged anti-discrimination
statute); Wong, supra note 212 (describing a bridal boutique that turned away same-sex brides).
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synagogue will perform marriages according to the tenets of their religion,
and the state has no say in the matter.214 But, the issue becomes a great deal
murkier when owners or operators of a wedding chapel that is open to the
public decide to pick and choose what marriages they will and will not host
or perform.
In Idaho, a married couple, who assert that both partners are "ordained
ministers with the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel,"
operating the for-profit Hitching Post Wedding Chapel, were confronted
with a local nondiscrimination ordinance.2 15 After the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals struck down Idaho's ban on same-sex marriage, they
temporarily closed down the chapel and have since refused to perform or
allow same-sex weddings on the premises. 2 16 Although the ordinance
contained a religious exemption and the city asserted that the religious
exemption would apply to them, they sued in federal court, asserting that
they were in fear of its enforcement.2 17 On March 25, 2016, the federal
district judge dismissed all of their claims except for economic injuries for
the single day of October 15, 2014, when they might have had a reasonable
fear of enforcement.2 18
Other private wedding chapels have also refused to permit or perform
same-sex weddings. 2 19 Even some Elvis-themed chapels in Las Vegas, the
"[M]arriage [C]apital of the [W]orld," have refused on religious grounds! 2 20
Although the issue of wedding venues' refusal to perform or permit
same-sex marriage has been widespread, it appears that there has been only
one reported merits decision on that subject to date. Cynthia and Robert
Gifford own and operate Liberty Ridge Farm, LLC, in New York and rent
214. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from establishing a religion or enacting
laws preventing free exercise of religion); see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1947)
(outlining the First Amendment protections for religious freedom).
215. See Zack Ford, For-ProfitWedding ChapelSues After Idaho Legalizes Same-Sex
Marriage,THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 20, 2014, 4:40 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/gbt/2014/10/20/3581733
/idaho-marriage-chapel-adf/ (reporting on the couple's lawsuit against the City of Coeur D'Alene).
216. See Knapp v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1133, 1135 (D. Idaho 2016)
(noting the couple's "insistence that they will refuse to perform same-sex wedding ceremonies").
217. Id. at 1120.
218. Id. at 1120, 1134.
219. See, e.g., Grant Rodgers, Grimes' Gortz Haus to Stop All Weddings in Wake of
DiscriminationComplaint, DES MOINES REG. (Jan. 28, 2015, 6:49 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister
com/story/news/investigations/2015/01/28/gortz-haus-owners-decide-stop-weddings/22492677/
(reporting on a private wedding venue in Iowa refusing a same-sex couple).
220. See Cavan Sieczkowski, Elvis-Themed Las Vegas Chapel Refuses to Hold Gay Weddings,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2014, 12:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/20/elvisthemed-vegas-gay-weddings_n_6014550.html (reporting at least one Elvis-themed Las Vegas chapel
refusing to marry same-sex couples "for Biblical reasons"). It is, of course, impossible to know what
"the King's" position on this subject would be.
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)

out part of the farm for both religious and secular wedding ceremonies and
receptions.22 1 In October 2011, they refused to host a wedding of two
women on religious grounds. 222 The women filed a discrimination
complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights, which
awarded each of them $1,500 in compensatory damages, imposed a
$10,000 fine, and ordered the Giffords to cease and desist their
discriminatory practices. 223 The New York State Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, upheld the Division's of Human Rights judgment against multiple
challenges, including the Giffords' free exercise of religion.224
Likewise, there appears to be only one reported judicial decision on the
refusal of a wedding photographer to be hired for a same-sex ceremony. In
Elane Photography v. Willock, a private company in New Mexico, which
acknowledged that it is a public accommodation, refused to be hired for a
same-sex "commitment ceremony." 2 25 (This was not a wedding per se, as
the state of New Mexico had not yet authorized same-sex marriages. 2 2 6
One of the women who had been denied service filed a discrimination
complaint with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission, which ruled
in her favor. 227 Elane Photography appealed through the state courts to the
New Mexico Supreme Court, which upheld the decision. 228 The court
rejected all of Elane's defenses, including free speech and free exercise of
religion. 2 2 9
In February 2017, the Washington State Supreme Court upheld
damages and an injunction against a flower shop and its owner for refusal
to provide flowers for a same-sex wedding. 23 0 The court rejected the
owner's claims of violation of her rights to free speech (i.e., against
"compelled speech"), free exercise of religion, and free association.23
The Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industry ordered bakery owners to
pay an astonishing $135,000 in damages for emotional suffering to a same-

221. Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30,33 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
222. Id. at 34.
223. Id
224. Id. at 40-42 (finding no violation of First Amendment rights).
225. Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58-59, 61 (N.M. 2013).
226. Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013) (redefining civil marriage in December of
2013 to include same-sex couples).
227. Elane Photography,309 P.3d at 60.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 60.
230. State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548, 568 (Wash. 2017).
231. Id. at 556, 568.
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sex couple to whom they had denied service.232 While such a large fine
seems grossly disproportionate, it was clearly meant to send a signal to
business owners in general not to discriminate against same-sex couples or
risk grave consequences.23 3
Similarly, in Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, a Colorado court of
appeals upheld the decision of that state's Human Rights Commission that a
"cakeshop" violated that state's Anti-Discrimination Act by refusing to
design and create a cake to celebrate a same-sex wedding. 23 4 The owner,
Phillips, had asserted that requiring him to do so violated his rights to free
exercise of religion and to free speech-in this case, his alleged right not to
be compelled to speak (i.e., tacitly approve of the wedding).235 In June
2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve the
following question:
Whether applying Colorado's public accommodations law to
compel Phillips to create expression that violates his sincerely
held religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 236
This high-profile case has attracted multiple amici, with, among others, the
United States supporting petitioner Masterpiece Cakeshop 237 and the
American Bar Association supporting the respondents.238

232.

Sweet Cakes by Melissa'Pays $135,000 Fine to OutragedGay Couple, BREITBART NEWS

(Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/12/28/sweet-cakes-by-melissa-pays135000-fine-to-outraged-gay-couple/.
233. See Casey Parks, Oregon Lawyers: Sweet Cakes by Melissa $135,000 Damage Award was
Justified, OREGONIAN (Aug. 25, 2016, 10:42 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/
08/oregon lawyers sweet cakes-by.html (discussing damage awards in a variety of cases involving
same-sex discrimination).
- 234. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276, 280 (Colo. App. 2015)
(explaining that the Colorado appellate court upheld the Commission's finding that the refusal to serve
the couple was because of the couple's sexual orientation).
235. Id. at 276, 283.
236. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rts.
Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111), at i (stating the question presented); Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 137 S. Ct. at 2290 (granting writ of certiorari).
237. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rts. Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111).
238. Brief of the Am. Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rts. Comm'n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111).

Icing on the Wedding Cake

2017]

219

F. Religious Freedom RestorationActs

'

In 1993, Congress enacted the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) to prohibit the federal government from taking any action that
substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, unless that action
constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling public
interest.23 9 Then, in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in City of Boerne v.
Flores, that the federal RFRA was unconstitutional to the extent that it tried
to control the actions of state and local government.2 4 0 As a result, by 2015,
21 states had enacted their own varying versions of religious freedom
legislation. 24
Pennsylvania's Religious Freedom Protection Act, enacted in 2002,
provides that (with certain exceptions) neither the Commonwealth nor its
political subdivisions may "burden a person's free exercise of religion,
including any burden which results from a rule of general applicability." 242
But the government may impose such a burden, provided that the burden is
"[i]n furtherance of a compelling [state] interest" and is "[t]he least
restrictive means of furthering th[at] compelling [state] interest." 243
In the Elane Photography case, discussed above, 2" Elane argued that
compelling her to photograph a same-sex couple's ceremony would violate
New Mexico's Religious Freedom Restoration Act (NMRFRA). 24 5 The
New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed because the NMRFRA was not
meant to apply to suits between private litigants, but is rather a restriction
on actions by government agencies that interfere with free exercise.246
In response to same-sex marriage rulings, rulings against businesses
refusing to extend their services to same-sex couples, local ordinances
protecting sexual minorities against discrimination, and a now-rescinded
239. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993);
see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (applying the RFRA
standard, the Court held that the action did not constitute the least restrictive means of serving the
government's interest).
240. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534, 536 (1997) (explaining that RFRA upset
the separation of powers and the federal balance by intruding on the states' general authority).
241.

2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NAT'L CONF. STATE. LEGISLATORS

(Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-rfra-legislation.aspx.
242. Religious Freedom Protection Act, 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2404(a) (West
2002).
243. Id. § 2404(b).
244. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text (discussing Elane Photography v. Willock,
309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013)).
245. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 60.
246. Id. at 76. Elane may well have had a telling argument as the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that a state court's enforcement of a private restrictive covenant constitutes state action. Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
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Obama administration federal interpretation concerning school bathrooms
for transgender students,2 4 7 several states have considered, and some have
enacted, new versions of state religious freedom laws intended to protect
such businesses. The governor of North Carolina, who signed such a law in
March 2016, intended, inter alia, to nullify provisions in a Charlotte
ordinance expanding protections for gays and lesbians.2 48 A few days later,
the governor of Georgia vetoed a similar measure that would have insulated
businesses refusing service to same-sex couples on religious grounds.2 49
In April 2016, Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant signed into law the
"Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination"
Act.250 The Act was intended to protect persons who refuse to provide
services to people because of religious objection to same-sex marriage."'
Thirteen individuals and two organizations promptly sued in federal court
to enjoin the law from taking effect. 25 2 On June 30, 2016, the day before the
law was to go into effect, federal Judge Carlton W. Reeves issued a
preliminary injunction to block it.253 Judge Reeves found that the law
established preferred religious beliefs in violation of the Establishment
Clause, and that its broad religious exemption comes at the expense of other
citizens.25 4 Governor Bryant has indicated that there will be an "aggressive
appeal" of the ruling.255

247. See Dear Colleague Letter on TransgenderStudents, U.S. DEP'TS OF JUSTICE, EDUC. (May

13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf
(summarizing schools' obligations under Title IX during the Obama administration).
248. Steve Harrison, NC. Gov PatMcCrory Signs into Law Bill Restricting LGBT Protections,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (March 23, 2016, 5:48 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/arti
cle67845317.html.
249. Georgia Governor Vetoes Religious Exemptions Bill, TELEGRAPH HERALD (March 28,
2016), http://www.thonline.com/news/nationalworld/article-ce5d679a-f4fa-11e5-ac9f-07236633ff48.h
tml/.

250. Camila Domonoske, Mississippi Governor Signs "Religious Freedom" Bill Into Law,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 5, 2016, 12:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/05/473
107959/mississippi-govemor-signs-religious-freedom-bill-into-law/.
251. Id
252. Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 688 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
253. Id at 724.
254. Id at 719, 721.
255. Neely Tucker, U.S. District Judge Strikes Down Mississippi's "Religious Freedom" Law,
WASH. POST (July 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/us-district-judge-strikesdown-mississippis-religious-freedom-law/2016/07/0 1/f98dc2ca-3ec9-1 1e6-a66f-aa6cl883b6blstory.ht
ml?utm_term=.766ae8a6d48b. Judge Reeves had already struck down application of the law to protect
clerks who refused to provide same-sex marriage licenses on religious grounds. Id
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III. THE FUTURE?

It should by now be abundantly clear that Obergefell has not ended the
battles surrounding same-sex marriage. Even had the decision been
unanimous, it would have been controversial. But the fact that four Justices,
including the Chief Justice, attacked the decision as a judicial usurpation of
power striking at the very heart of democracy has given impetus and
imprimatur to those who oppose it.256 Arguably, the four dissenters have
harmed the status of the Court itself by giving fodder to those who oppose
not only Obergefell, but other decisions as well, and consider themselves
not bound by decisions with which they disagree. This would be extremely
unfortunate.
At this writing, the United States is in political and legal flux. Justice
Scalia, a reliable vote against all decisions advancing gay rights,257 died in
February 2016.258 The next month, President Obama nominated Circuit
Court Judge Merrick Garland to replace Scalia on the Court, but Senate
Republicans refused to even consider the nomination.25 9
As the 2016 presidential election approached, the two main political
parties officially took diametrically opposing views on these issues in their
official party platforms. The Republican Platform included the following
language:
[O]nly by electing a Republican president in 2016 will America
have the opportunity for up to five new constitutionally-minded
Supreme Court justices appointed to fill vacancies on the Court.
Only such appointments will enable courts to begin to reverse the
long line of activist decisions-including . . Obergefell ... that
have
usurped
Congress's
and
states'
lawmaking
authority . . .. We support the right of the people to conduct their

businesses in accordance with their religious beliefs and

256. See Mark Strasser, Obergefell, Dignity, and the Family, 19 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 317,
348-49 (2016) (discussing the future implications of the four vehemently written dissents in Obergefell
as possible grounds for undermining non-unanimous opinions).
257. See Robert E. Rains, The Future of Justice Scalia's Predictionsof Family Law Doom, 29
BYU J. PUB. L. 353, 353-55 (2015) (listing "vehement dissent[s]" from Justice Scalia in several gayrights cases).
258. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
259. Stephen Collinson et al., Obama Nominates Merrick Garland to Supreme Court, CNN
(March 16, 2016, 5:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/16/politics/obama-supreme-courtannouncement/index.html.
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condemn public officials who have proposed boycotts against
businesses that support traditional marriage. 260
In stark contrast, the 2016 Democratic Party Platform stated:
Democrats applaud last year's decision by the Supreme Court
that recognized that LGBT people-like other Americans-have
the right to marry the person they love.... Democrats will fight
for the continued development of sex discrimination law to cover
LGBT people.... We support a progressive vision of religious
freedom that respects pluralism and rejects the misuse of religion
to discriminate.

26 1

Within days of his inauguration, newly elected President Trump
nominated Judge Neil M. Gorsuch to fill Scalia's vacant seat on the
Court. 26 2 Gorsuch was confirmed by the U.S. Senate after that body
changed its rules to permit confirmation to a Supreme Court seat by a
simple-majority vote. 26 3 Gorsuch is widely viewed as sharing Scalia's legal
philosophy (and to some extent his writing style). 2 64 He quickly fulfilled his
supporters' hopes by dissenting from the summary reversal of Arkansas's
refusal to automatically list same-sex spouses as second parents on birth

certificates.265
Moreover, several of the remaining justices are hardly young. Kennedy
was born in 1936, Ginsburg in 1933, and Breyer in 1938.266 All three have
been staunch supporters of gay rights and were in the majority on
Obergefell.267 Actually, it is not unlikely that President Trump will have
260.
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http://s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.democrats.org/Downloads/2016_DNCPlatform.pdf.
262. Julie Hirschfield et al., Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/supreme-court-nominee-trump.html?
r-0.

263. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmedby Senate as Supreme Court
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supr
eme-court.html.
264. Adam Liptak, In Judge Gorsuch, an Echo ofScalia in Philosophyand Style, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-nominee
.html.
265. See supranotes 185-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinion in Pavan v.
Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2076-77, 2079 (2017) (per curiam)).
266. Biographies of Current Justices, U.S. SUP. CT., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biog
raphies.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
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more than one seat on the Court to fill, which could change its overall
ideological balance.2 68 Only one thing is certain: the struggles for and
against gay rights in the United States will continue far into the indefinite
future.
IV. A WAY FORWARD?

Advocates for the rights of sexual minorities quite reasonably want the
same rights, on the same terms, as everyone else. Unquestionably, that wish
runs counter to many persons' sincerely held religious or moral beliefs.
Either side can, and often does, take an absolutist approach.269 Sexual
minorities often want to compel all people to recognize and deal with them
as equals in all matters, including matters with religious overtones.2 70
People who object for sincere religious reasons (or possibly less sincere and
less religious reasons) often want not only to refuse to accommodate sexual
minorities, but, as in the cases of Roy Moore and Kim Davis, to prevent
others from doing so. 271
Cogent arguments can be made on each side of this divide. Sexual
minorities may justifiably argue that private prejudices can never be the
basis for public policy.2 7 2 They may assert that public officials are sworn to
uphold the law, and if they feel they cannot do so, their duty is to resign.
They may argue that private individuals or entities, for-profit or otherwise,
which enter into the stream of commerce, must make their services
available to all individuals on an equal basis. Further, should it become
acceptable for public officials or private entities providing public
accommodations to discriminate on the basis of sexuality, this will readily
lead to other forms of divisive discrimination. For instance, could a baker
refuse to bake a cake or a florist refuse to provide flowers for a marriage
involving an interracial couple, an interfaith couple, a Jewish or Muslim or
Greek couple, a second marriage, a marriage where the parties are "living in
sin," a marriage that has already produced a child, a marriage where the
bride is pregnant, a marriage where one of the parties is not a virgin, etc.?
Recognizing that prejudice will not end overnight with or without a
Supreme Court decision, is it not better to enforce nondiscrimination with
268. Eric Segall, Opinion, What Will Trump's Supreme Court Look Like?, NEWSWEEK (Nov.
17, 2016, 7:50 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/what-will-trumps-supreme-court-look-521581/.
269. See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK.
L. REv. 61, 62-63 (2006) (explaining how opposing groups "tend to talk past each other").
270. Id.
271. Id. at 63.
272. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("The Constitution cannot control such
[racial] prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.").
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the hope that, over time, prejudice will dissipate? Probably relatively few
Americans today really believe that stores should be allowed to refuse
service based on race or religion, or that black Americans should have to sit
in the back of the bus, as was the law in many places until our country took
a firm stand on these matters a half century ago.273
On the other side, persons of certain religious beliefs may assert that
they should not be compelled to commit acts that force them to commit
what they believe to be sin, nor be complicit in sin, and that the Free
Exercise Clause was specifically designed to prevent such a result. They
may assert that at least as long as sexual minorities have other options
readily available to them to achieve their desired ends (for instance, a
marriage license issued by the clerk at the next window or bouquets from
another local florist), those with religious objections should be allowed to
adhere to their sincere beliefs. They may assert that they should be
protected against compelled speech they find objectionable. 274 They might
ask whether, if they can be forced to bake a cake for a same-sex marriage, a
bakery owned by a same-sex couple could be compelled to bake a cake
with an anti-gay message.27 5 They may assert that compelling individuals to
act against their sincere beliefs or risk a heavy fine or going out of business
will only heighten antagonisms, not diffuse them.
Recognizing that no solution to this dilemma will please everyone, I
offer the following as a possible roadmap:
1. All government officials, at all levels, must perform the same
services for same-sex couples they perform for all other couples, unless:
a. the service is immediately made available by another
government official,
b. with no delay or inconvenience to the applicant(s), and
c. at no or insignificant expense to the public.
2. Private entities operating public accommodations (wedding chapels,
florists, photographers, bakers, seamstresses, etc.) must accommodate the
entire public, unless:

273. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (striking down "separate but
equal" segregation laws in public education on equal protection grounds under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
274. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 512 U.S. 457, 470-72 (1997)
(distinguishing forced participation of financing generic advertising from impermissible actions that
require individuals to seemingly subscribe to an ideological message, even if they personally object).
275. This is not a fanciful hypothetical. The Colorado Court of Appeals in the Masterpiece
Cakeshop case distinguished prior decisions of the Colorado Civil Rights Division that bakeries had not
violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act when they had refused, for example, to bake bibleshaped cakes with inscriptions such as, "Homosexuality is a detestable sin. Leviticusl8:2." Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Col. App. 2015).
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a. a religious objector would be compelled to make explicit speech
contrary to his or her sincerely held religious beliefs, such as:
i. an officiant being compelled to perform a marriage
ceremony contrary to his or her religious beliefs, or
ii. a baker being compelled to explicitly endorse same-sex
marriage (not merely bake and decorate a cake).
Unquestionably, the compromise above would leave many people, on
both sides of our cultural/religious divide, unhappy, and leave many
questions to be litigated. How much public expense is insignificant, when
does nonverbal speech become explicit, etc.?
On the other hand, a clear ruling by the Supreme Court in the pending
Masterpiece Cakeshop case that bakers have no constitutional right to
refuse their services for same-sex weddings would have the advantage of
providing a relatively clear rule for bakeries and most other private
businesses, although wedding chapels and venues might perhaps have
stronger claims for an exception.276 But such a ruling would also invite a
hodgepodge of state and local
legislation trying to carve out exceptions to
27 7
the nondiscrimination rule.
A ruling that bakers do have a constitutional right not to provide their
services would likewise settle that matter, but leave unclear the status of
florists, photographers, etc. Advocates for same-sex couples could
reasonably argue that making a floral arrangement or sewing a wedding
dress does not entail the sort of expressive conduct involved in making
icing on the cake saying, for instance, "God Bless the Marriage of Mary
and Sue."
No solution will satisfy all parties. Perhaps it is time to look for
compromise.
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276. Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, ContemplatingMasterpiece Cakeshop, 74 WASH.
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